People's peace treaty

CCAS National Coordinators

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The beginning stages of the People's Peace Treaty Campaign hopefully indicate a renewal of mass activity in the American anti-war movement. Many in the movement have long been aware that anti-war activities were too crisis-oriented. They acted; we responded and created a big fuss. This has put the movement in the position of always asking that something worse not be done, since we lacked the power to force the government to step backwards. The aim of the People's Peace Treaty campaign is to build before the next escalation, to take the initiative in demanding a complete end to the war, to make the American people realize that we can't wait to respond to the next crisis, for the crisis is now. The peace treaty evolved from the anti-war movement's understanding of two events: first, the shift in American policy to Vietnamization; and second, the growing anti-war movement in South Vietnam.

"Vietnamization" is Nixon's name for the transition from direct U.S. military intervention to an indirect war. This indirect war, characterized by the use of tactical and strategic firepower, Southeast Asian armies, and native mercenaries, means unprecedented human and material destruction. No longer will U.S. troops sweep across fields and through villages taking casualties in exchange for destruction in search of the NLF. Now the most massive aerial bombardment in the history of warfare will quietly and impartially obliterate much of rural Indochina. Previously, the movement was dealing with war crimes and combating war criminals—now it must defeat a military policy which is even more blatantly genocidal.

As Vietnamization has gone forward, the political situation in South Vietnam's cities has changed dramatically. A mass anti-American coalition has emerged from the urban sector of South Vietnam. This coalition, called the Popular Front for the Defense of Peace (PFDP), is composed of many groups which have been politically passive or conservative in the past. Still, its political demands (as Cynthia Fredrick shows in her analysis in this Bulletin) are somewhat to the left of the NLF.

It was in response to this South Vietnamese movement that the National Student Association (NSA) sent its delegation to Vietnam in December of 1970. Composed largely of university and college student body presidents, the members of the NSA delegation met with representatives of the PFDP in Saigon and the DRV Student's Union in Hanoi. After many hours of discussion and negotiations, the Americans and Vietnamese reached a strong consensus on what they felt to be workable peace proposals. The Saigon and Hanoi documents were merged into a single declaration in Paris, after the NSA delegation met with Madame Binh, representative of the Provisional Revolutionary Government at the Paris Peace Talks. This declaration is as follows:

**JOINT TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, SOUTH VIETNAM AND NORTH VIETNAM**

Be it known that the American and Vietnamese peoples are not enemies. The war is carried out in the names of the people of the United States and South Vietnam but without our consent. It destroys the land and people of Vietnam. It drains America of its resources, its youth and its honor.
1. The Americans agree to the immediate and total withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Vietnam.

2. The Vietnamese pledge that, as soon as the U.S. government publicly sets a date for total withdrawal, they will enter discussions to secure the release of all American prisoners, including pilots captured while bombing North Vietnam.

3. There will be an immediate cease-fire between U.S. forces and those led by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam.

4. They will enter discussions on the procedures to guarantee the safety of all withdrawing troops.

5. The Americans pledge to end the imposition of Thieu-Ky-Khiem on the people of South Vietnam in order to insure their right to self-determination and so that all political prisoners can be released.

6. The Vietnamese pledge to form a provisional coalition government to organise democratic elections. All parties agree to respect the results of elections in which all South Vietnamese can participate freely without the presence of any foreign troops.

7. The South Vietnamese pledge to enter discussions of procedures to guarantee the safety and political freedom of those South Vietnamese who have collaborated with the U.S. or with the U.S.-supported regime.

8. The Americans and Vietnamese agree to respect the independence, peace and neutrality of Laos and Cambodia in accord with the 1954 and 1962 Geneva conventions and not to interfere in the internal affairs of these two countries.

9. Upon these points of agreement, we pledge to end the war and resolve all other questions in the spirit of self-determination and mutual respect for the independence and political freedom of the people of Vietnam and the United States.

By ratifying this agreement, we pledge to take whatever actions are appropriate to implement the terms of this joint treaty and to insure its acceptance by the government of the United States.

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This treaty brings together the American and Vietnamese peoples, and at the same time separates them from their respective official leaders. For an American to sign the treaty is to say: "I am not at war with the people of Vietnam. In prosecuting this war, the Nixon regime represents neither me nor the American people." If the treaty campaign can push this concept into the minds of the American public, their political consciousness, as well as that of the anti-war movement itself, will be raised.

The treaty is not the property of the NSA, but belongs to any group which cares to ratify it and work to see it implemented. Any political, social, or economic unit, whether it be a labor union, city government, or student body, can conclude peace with the Vietnamese by ratifying the treaty. However, it is then faced with a more difficult task—having concluded peace, the group must withdraw from the war. For union members it may mean ending their union's economic and political support for the war; for consumers it may mean tax resistance; for students it may mean draft resistance and bringing an end to university complicity with the war machine.

The People's Peace Treaty divides into two logical stages: ratification and implementation. Ratification would
ideally involve giving every American a chance to discuss the treaty and decide on its merits. For CCAS this would mean that we should vote to accept or reject the treaty. If we accept the treaty, then we might begin a public campaign to explain the treaty to those groups who have called on us for literature and speakers in the past and we might join efforts to have it ratified by the larger units to which we belong. Implementation involves all of the various political actions people might take to express support for the treaty and their opposition to the continued commitment of the Nixon administration to criminal war policies. NSA, as well as other student and youth groups working with the treaty, tend to favor a campaign of prolonged, mass civil disobedience in Washington, D. C., during the first week of May as the most effective means of implementing the treaty. We feel that the People’s Peace Treaty merits discussion at the local, regional, and national meetings of CCAS. And if we decide in its favor, we should begin work now to make it successful.

Felicia Oldfather & Al McCoy

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